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Abstract
In this study, we analyze the e¤ects of labor shortage in China on the direction
of innovation in the US by incorporating production o¤shoring into a North-South
model of directed technical change. We nd that if o¤shoring is present (absent) in
equilibrium, then a decrease (an increase) in unskilled labor in the South would lead
to skill-biased technical change in the North. This nding highlights the di¤erent
implications of o¤shoring and conventional trade on innovation. Furthermore, we nd
that an increase in the Southern stock of capital reduces o¤shoring and also leads to
skill-biased technical change. Therefore, rapid capital accumulation and labor shortage
in China could lead to a rising skill premium in the US. Calibrating the model to
China-US data, we nd that a 1% decrease in unskilled labor (1% increase in capital)
in China leads to a 0.8% (0.6%) increase in the skill premium in the US under a
moderate elasticity of substitution between skill-intensive and labor-intensive goods.
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1 Introduction
After three decades of economic development, China is now facing a shortage of workers,
especially among coastal cities. "According to a director of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, Chinas coastal cities are short an estimated 10 million workers."1 As a result of
this shortage of workers in China, wages have been rising rapidly. For example, it is not
uncommon for manufacturing plants in China to experience rising wages of 20% per year.2
Given this rapidly rising wages, China is becoming a less attractive place for the o¤shoring
of manufacturing activities. A recent article of The Economist documents a reversing trend
of production o¤shoring from developed economies to China;3 for example, "[t]he Boston
Consulting Group reckons that in areas such as transport, computers, fabricated metals and
machinery, 10-30% of the goods that America now imports from China could be made at
home by 2020". The article also argues that this reversing trend is due to changes in the
manufacturing process in developed economies such as the digitization of manufacturing;4
as a result of which, "companies now want to be closer to their customers so that they can
respond more quickly to changes in demand. And some products are so sophisticated that
it helps to have the people who design them and the people who make them in the same
place." In other words, this new manufacturing process is relatively skill-intensive.
In this study, we analyze the e¤ects of labor shortage in China on the direction of innova-
tion in the US by incorporating production o¤shoring into a North-South model of directed
technical change based on Acemoglu (1998, 2002, 2003), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and
Acemoglu et al. (2012). We nd that if the equilibrium features o¤shoring, then a decrease
in unskilled labor in the South would lead to skill-biased technical change in the North. In
contrast, if the equilibrium does not feature o¤shoring, then a decrease in Southern unskilled
labor would lead to unskill-biased technical change. Intuitively, when o¤shoring is absent
in equilibrium, a reduction in the supply of unskilled labor in the South causes through
international trade a price e¤ect that improves incentives of innovation for labor-intensive
goods. On the other hand, when o¤shoring is present in equilibrium, a reduction in the sup-
ply of unskilled labor in the South causes also a market size e¤ect that improves incentives
of innovation for skill-intensive goods. This nding highlights the di¤erent implications of
o¤shoring and conventional trade on the direction of technological progress.
The above theoretical result is consistent with the following stylized facts. When China
rst opened up its economy for international trade in the 1980s, there was essentially no
o¤shoring to the economy. Together with a low level of patent protection in China at that
time,5 the opening of the Chinese economy implies a massive increase in the supply of
unskilled labor in the world causing predominantly a price e¤ect that improves incentives of
1Forbes, "In Coastal China, A Labor Shortage", December 20, 2011.
2The Economist, "The End of Cheap China", March 10, 2012.
3The Economist, "The Third Industrial Revolution", April 21, 2012.
4An important technology under the digitization of manufacturing is 3D printing, "which creates a solid
object by building up successive layers of material. The digital design can be tweaked with a few mouseclicks.
The 3D printer can run unattended, and can make many things which are too complex for a traditional factory
to handle."
5For example, the Ginarte-Park index of patent rights in China was 1.33 in 1985; see Park (2008). The
Ginarte-Park index is on a scale of 0 to 5, and a larger number implies stronger patent rights.
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innovation directed to the relatively scarce factor, i.e., skilled labors.6 After the mid 1990s,
the amount of o¤shoring to China started to increase rapidly. Together with an increased level
of patent protection in China,7 the recent shortage of unskilled labor in China causes mainly
a market size e¤ect that improves incentives of innovation directed to the now relatively
abundant factor, i.e., skilled labors.8
Another stylized fact of the Chinese economy is that capital investment as a share of
gross domestic product (GDP) is about 40% and substantially higher than many developed
economies. So long as the depreciation rates of capital are not substantially di¤erent across
countries, China is accumulating capital at a much faster rate than developed countries.
From our theoretical analysis, we nd that an increase in the stock of capital in the South
relative to the North would reduce o¤shoring. Intuitively, a larger stock of capital in China
increases the wage rates of Chinese workers rendering o¤shoring to China less attractive.
As a result, a larger stock of capital in the South also leads to skill-biased technical change
in the North. Therefore, both the stylized facts of rapid capital accumulation and labor
shortage in China could contribute to skill-biased technical change in the US.
We calibrate the model to China-US data to provide a quantitative analysis. Due to skill-
biased technical change, either a decrease in unskilled labor or an increase in capital stock in
the South would raise the skill premium in the North. The magnitude of the changes depends
on the elasticity of substitution between skill-intensive and labor-intensive goods. We nd
that a 1% decrease in the supply of unskilled labor in China leads to a 0.8% (3.7%) increase
in the skill premium in the US when the elasticity of substitution is 2.2 (2.4). Furthermore, a
1% increase in the capital stock in China leads to a 0.6% (2.0%) increase in the skill premium
in the US when the elasticity of substitution is 2.2 (2.4).
This paper relates to studies on directed technical change, such as Acemoglu (1998, 2002,
2003), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and Gancia and Bonglioli (2008). These inuential
studies built on the literature of R&D-driven economic growth to analyze the direction of
innovation.9 Acemoglu (1998, 2002) analyzes skill-biased technical change and the rising
skill premium in the US, whereas Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and
Gancia and Bonglioli (2008) analyze the implications of trade on skill-biased technical
change and productivity di¤erences across countries. However, the abovementioned studies
do not consider o¤shoring. This paper also relates to studies on o¤shoring; see Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) for a recent contribution and their discussion of earlier studies.
The present paper complements these two branches of literature by providing an analysis on
the e¤ects of o¤shoring on the direction of technological progress.
A recent study by Acemoglu et al. (2012) also analyzes the e¤ects of o¤shoring on skill-
biased technical change. In addition to some di¤erences in modelling details, our study di¤ers
from their interesting analysis in a number of important dimensions. First, Acemoglu et al.
(2012) analyze the e¤ects of an o¤shoring-cost parameter on skill-biased technical change,
6From 1980 to 1995, the share of population in China with at least completion of secondary education
was on average 13.7%; see the Barro-Lee dataset on educational attainment.
7The Ginarte-Park index of patent rights in China was 4.08 in 2005; see Park (2008).
8From 2000 to 2010, the share of population in China with at least completion of secondary education
was on average 39.5%; see the Barro-Lee dataset.
9See Romer (1990), Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992) for seminal studies in this literature and Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) for a survey.
3
whereas we analyze the e¤ects of labor shortage and capital accumulation on skill-biased
technical change through o¤shoring. Second, we calibrate our model to China-US data and
nd that in the recent episode of trade in China, the degree of o¤shoring is su¢ ciently high
such that a decrease in unskilled labor supply in China would lead to skill-biased technical
change and a rising skill premium in the US. We believe that our study provides a useful
complementary analysis to Acemoglu et al. (2012) on this unchartered area of o¤shoring
and directed technological progress.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
analyzes the e¤ects of Southern labor supply and capital stock on the direction of Northern
innovation. The nal section concludes.
2 A North-South model of directed technical change
In this section, we consider a North-South model of directed technical change based on
Acemoglu (2002). The innovation process is in the form of variety expansion. When an
R&D entrepreneur invents a new variety, her patents generate monopolistic prots in the
Northern market and possibly also in the Southern market depending on the level of patent
protection in the South. Final goods are produced using skill-intensive and labor-intensive
goods, which are freely traded across countries, but capital and labors are immobile across
countries. To consider production o¤shoring, we follow Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)
to assume that o¤shoring involves a variable cost.
2.1 Households
In the North, there is a representative household with the following lifetime utility function.
U =
1Z
0
e t lnCnt dt, (1)
where Cnt denotes consumption in the North at time t, and  > 0 is the subjective discount
rate. The household maximizes utility subject to the following asset-accumulation equation.
_Ant = rtA
n
t + w
n
h;tH
n + wnl;tL
n + qnt K
n   Cnt . (2)
Ant is the amount of nancial assets in the form of patents owned by the household, and rt
is the rate of return.10 Hn and Ln are respectively the inelastic supply of high-skilled and
low-skilled labors. wnh;t and w
n
l;t are respectively the wage rates of high-skilled and low-skilled
labors. Kn is the inelastic supply of capital,11 and qnt is the rental price of capital. From
10rt is not indexed by a superscript because we assume that there is a global nancial market, and our
derivations are robust any distribution of nancial assets across the two countries. One special case is that
all nancial assets are owned by the Northern household.
11We di¤er from Acemoglu (2002) by assuming that intermediate goods are produced using capital instead
of nal goods. For simplicity, we consider an inelastic supply of capital, which also allows us to analyze the
comparative statics of the capital stock.
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standard dynamic optimization, the familiar Euler equation is
_Cnt
Cnt
= rt   . (3)
As for the South, there are analogous conditions. Finally, we assume that the North is
more skill-abundant than the South (i.e., Hn=Ln > Hs=Ls) and that the North is also more
capital-abundant than the South (i.e., Kn=Ln > Ks=Ls).12
2.2 Final goods
The production of nal goods is perfectly competitive; therefore, it does not matter where
production takes place. Final goods are produced with the following CES aggregator.
Yt =
h

 
Y nl;t + Y
s
l;t
(" 1)="
+ (1  )  Y nh;t + Y sh;t(" 1)="i"=(" 1) , (4)
where Y nl;t and Y
s
l;t are respectively labor-intensive goods produced in the North and in the
South, and Y nh;t and Y
s
h;t are respectively skill-intensive goods produced in the North and in
the South. " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the two types of goods,13 and 
determines their relative importance. fY nl;t; Y sl;t; Y nh;t; Y sh;tg are freely traded across countries
subject to international prices fPl;t; Ph;tg. The standard price index of nal goods is
1 =

" (Pl;t)
1 " + (1  )" (Ph;t)1 "
1=(1 ")
, (5)
where we have set the price of nal goods (numeraire) to one. The resource constraint for
nal goods is
Yt = Rt + C
n
t + C
s
t , (6)
where Rt is the global amount of nal goods devoted to R&D.
2.3 Labor-intensive goods
In the South, the production function of labor-intensive goods is
Y sl;t =
(lst )

1  
Z Nl;t
0
[xsl;t(i)]
1 di

(Nl;t)
1 , (7)
where  > ("   2)=("   1) determines the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
inputs. lst is the amount of Southern unskilled labor employed in the production of Y
s
l;t.
In addition to using labor, the production of Y sl;t requires di¤erentiated intermediate inputs
xnl;t(i) for i 2 [0; Nl;t], where Nl;t is the number of di¤erentiated inputs for labor-intensive
goods that have been invented as of time t. The term (Nl;t)1  captures an externality e¤ect
12See for example, Bai et al. (2006) for a discussion on the relatively low capital-labor ratio in China.
13See Acemoglu (2003) for a discussion of evidence for " > 1.
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of Nl;t on the production of Y sl;t in order to ensure a balanced growth path along which Nl;t
and Y sl;t grow at the same rate; see also Acemoglu et al. (2012).
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In the North, the production function of labor-intensive goods is given by
Y nl;t =
(lnt + l
s
t)

1  
Z Nl;t
0
[xnl;t(i)]
1 di

(Nl;t)
1 , (8)
where lst is the amount of Southern unskilled labor employed by Northern rms to produce
Y nl;t capturing the o¤shoring of production. Following Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008),
we use a parameter  2 (0; 1) to capture the variable cost of o¤shoring. A higher cost of
o¤shoring is reected by a smaller value of . If  = 0, then o¤shoring of labor-intensive
goods would be absent,15 and the model is left with conventional trade in fY nl;t; Y sl;t; Y nh;t; Y sh;tg.
We refer to a larger  as a higher degree of o¤shoring. As a result of o¤shoring, the resource
constraint for Southern unskilled labor is lst + l
s
t = L
s, whereas the resource constraint for
Northern unskilled labor is lnt = L
n.
2.4 Skill-intensive goods
In the South, the production function of skill-intensive goods is given by
Y sh;t =
(hst)

1  
Z Nh;t
0
[xsh;t(j)]
1 dj

(Nh;t)
1 . (9)
hst is the amount of Southern skilled labor employed in the production of Y
s
h;t. In addition
to using labor, the production of Y sh;t requires di¤erentiated intermediate inputs x
n
h;t(j) for
j 2 [0; Nh;t], where Nh;t is the number of di¤erentiated inputs for skill-intensive goods that
have been invented as of time t. The term (Nh;t)1  captures an externality e¤ect of Nh;t on
the production of Y sh;t in order to ensure a balanced growth path along which Nh;t and Y
s
h;t
grow at the same rate.
In the North, the production function of labor-intensive goods is given by
Y nh;t =
(hnt )

1  
Z Nh;t
0
[xnh;t(j)]
1 dj

(Nh;t)
1 , (10)
where we have ruled out o¤shoring of skill-intensive goods.16 Due to the absence of o¤shoring
for skill-intensive goods, the resource constraint for Southern skilled labor is hst = H
s,
whereas the resource constraint for Northern skilled labor is hnt = H
n.
14In Acemoglu (2002), this externality is not needed because xnl;t(i) is produced from nal goods, whereas
xnl;t(i) is produced from a xed supply of capital in the present study.
15In fact, we nd that if  is below a threshold value, then o¤shoring would be absent in equilibrium.
16We have found that if and only if a knife-edge condition holds such that the costs of o¤shoring for
labor-intensive and skill-intensive goods are the same (i.e., h = l =  > 0), then the model would feature
o¤shoring in both sectors. Given that our focus is on the o¤shoring of labor-intensive goods, we consider
the case of 0  h < l =  under which the equilibrium features zero o¤shoring of skill-intensive goods and
is identical to the case of h = 0.
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2.5 Intermediate inputs for labor-intensive goods
In the North, the production function of di¤erentiated intermediate input i for labor-intensive
goods is
xnl;t(i) = k
n
l;t(i) (11)
for i 2 [0; Nl;t]. In other words, one unit of capital produces one unit of intermediate input.
Given the capital-rental price qnt in the North, the monopolistic producer of di¤erentiated
intermediate input i charges a prot-maximizing markup n over qnt such that
pnl;t(i) = p
n
l;t = 
nqnt , (12)
where n = 1=(1  ) > 1. Therefore, the amount of prot captured by intermediate input
i in the North is
nl;t(i) = (1  1=n)pnl;t(i)xnl;t(i) = pnl;txnl;t (13)
for i 2 [0; Nl;t].
In the South, the production function of di¤erentiated intermediate input i for labor-
intensive goods is
xsl;t(i) = k
s
l;t(i) (14)
for i 2 [0; Nl;t]. Given the capital-rental price qst in the South, the monopolistic producer of
di¤erentiated intermediate input i charges a markup s over qst such that
psl;t(i) = 
sqst . (15)
Here we follow Goh and Olivier (2002) to model incomplete patent protection that constrains
the markup in the South;17 specically, we assume that s = 1=(1 )  n where  2 [0; ].
Intuitively, the presence of potential imitation due to incomplete patent protection forces the
monopolistic producers to lower their markup in the South. If  =  ( = 0), then patent
protection is complete (zero) in the South. The amount of prot captured by intermediate
input i in the South is
sl;t(i) = (1  1=s)psl;t(i)xsl;t(i) = psl;txsl;t. (16)
2.6 Intermediate inputs for skill-intensive goods
In the North, the production function of di¤erentiated intermediate input j for skill-intensive
goods is
xnh;t(j) = k
n
h;t(j) (17)
for j 2 [0; Nh;t]. Given the capital-rental price qnt in the North, the monopolistic producer of
di¤erentiated intermediate input j charges a prot-maximizing markup n over qnt such that
pnh;t(j) = p
n
h;t = 
nqnt , (18)
17See also Li (2001), Chu (2011) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2012).
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where n = 1=(1  ) > 1. Therefore, the amount of prot captured by intermediate input
j in the North is
nh;t(j) = (1  1=n)pnh;t(j)xnh;t(j) = pnh;txnh;t. (19)
Due to symmetry, the resource constraint for capital in the North is Nl;txnl;t + Nh;tx
n
h;t =
Knl;t +K
n
h;t = K
n.
In the South, the production function of di¤erentiated intermediate input j for skill-
intensive goods is
xsh;t(j) = k
s
h;t(j) (20)
for j 2 [0; Nh;t]. Given the capital-rental price qst in the South, the monopolistic producer of
di¤erentiated intermediate input j charges a constrained markup s over qst such that
psh;t(j) = p
s
h;t = 
sqst , (21)
where s = 1=(1  )  n. Therefore, the amount of prot captured by intermediate input
j in the South is
sh;t(j) = (1  1=s)psh;t(j)xsh;t(j) = psh;txsh;t. (22)
The resource constraint for capital in the South is Nl;txsl;t +Nh;tx
s
h;t = K
s
l;t +K
s
h;t = K
s.
2.7 R&D
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs investing in R&D, and the invention of a new variety
of skill-intensive or labor-intensive inputs requires  units of nal goods. If  is the same
across the two countries, then the location of R&D is indeterminate, and our derivations
are robust to any geographical distribution of R&D. If  is smaller in the North than in
the South, then innovation takes place only in the North as in for example, Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (2001) and Gancia and Bonglioli (2008).18 When an entrepreneur invents a new
variety, she obtains patents in both the North and the South.19 The innovation process is
_Nz;t = Rz;t= (23)
for z 2 fh; lg. Suppose we denote Vz;t as the value of an invention. Free entry ensures that
(Vz;t   ) _Nz;t = 0 (24)
for z 2 fh; lg. The familiar Bellman equation is
rt =
nz;t + 
s
z;t + _Vz;t
Vz;t
(25)
for z 2 fh; lg. Intuitively, the Bellman equation equates the interest rate to the asset return
per unit of asset, where the asset return is the sum of monopolistic prots nz;t + 
s
z;t and
any potential capital gain _Vz;t.
18See Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) for a discussion of evidence that 90% of global R&D is performed in
OECD countries and 35% in the US.
19It is useful to note that given the global nancial market, patents that are based on a variety invented
in the North (South) are not necessarily solely owned by Northern (Southern) households.
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2.8 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of prices frt; wnl;t; wsl;t; wnh;t; wsh;t; qnt ; qst ; Pl;t; Ph;t; pnl;t(i); psl;t(i);
pnh;t(j); p
s
h;t(j)g and a time path of allocations fRl;t; Rh;t; Cnt ; Cst ; Yt; Y nl;t; Y sl;t; Y nh;t; Y sh;t; xnl;t(i);
xsl;t(i); x
n
h;t(j); x
s
h;t(j); l
n
t ; l
s
t ; l
s
t ; h
n
t ; h
s
tg. Also, at each instance of time, the followings hold:
 Households maximize utility taking frt; wnl;t; wnh;t; qnt ; wsl;t; wsh;t; qstg as given;
 Competitive nal-goods rms produce fYtg to maximize prot taking prices fPl;t; Ph;tg
as given;
 Competitive labor-intensive goods rms in the two countries produce fY nl;t; Y sl;tg to
maximize prot taking the international price fPl;tg as given;
 Competitive skill-intensive goods rms in the two countries produce fY nh;t; Y sh;tg to max-
imize prot taking the international price fPh;tg as given;
 Monopolistic intermediate-goods rms in the labor-intensive sector produce fxnl;t(i); xsl;t(i)g
and choose fpnl;t(i); psl;t(i)g to maximize prot taking prices fqnt ; qstg as given;
 Monopolistic intermediate-goods rms in the skill-intensive sector produce fxnh;t(j); xsh;t(j)g
and choose fpnh;t(j); psh;t(j)g to maximize prot taking prices fqnt ; qstg as given;
 R&D rms choose fRl;t; Rh;tg to maximize prot taking fVh;t; Vl;tg as given;
 The market-clearing condition for unskilled labor in the two countries holds such that
lnt = L
n and lst + l
s
t = L
s;
 The market-clearing condition for skilled labor in the two countries holds such that
hnt = H
n and hst = H
s;
 The market-clearing condition for capital in the two countries holds such that Nl;txnl;t+
Nh;tx
n
h;t = K
n and Nl;txsl;t +Nh;tx
s
h;t = K
s;
 The market-clearing condition for nal goods holds such that Yt = Rl;t+Rh;t+Cnt +Cst .
2.9 Balanced growth equilibrium
In this subsection, we discuss the balanced growth equilibrium of the model. The model
features a unique steady-state value of Nh;t=Nl;t. If the initial value of Nh;t=Nl;t is above
(below) this steady-state value, then the equilibrium initially features R&D in labor-intensive
(skill-intensive) goods only until the economy reaches the balanced growth path along which
Nh;t and Nl;t grow at the same rate. On the balanced growth path, the equilibrium features
a positive amount of o¤shoring if and only if  is su¢ ciently large. We summarize these
results in Proposition 1.
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Proposition 1 The dynamics of Nh;t=Nl;t is characterized by global stability such that the
economy converges to a unique and stable balanced growth path along which Nh;t and Nl;t
grow at the same rate. If and only if  > [(Ks=Ls)=(Kn=Ln)]1 , then the equilibrium would
feature a positive amount of o¤shoring (i.e., ls > 0).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The threshold value of  above which the equilibrium features o¤shoring is given by
[(Ks=Ls)=(Kn=Ln)]1  < 1. Intuitively, in the presence of o¤shoring, the wage rate of
unskilled labor in the South must be a fraction  of that in the North. However, if the
capita-labor ratio in the South is su¢ ciently high relative to the North, then it would be
impossible for the South to have such a low relative wage in equilibrium.
3 How the South a¤ects innovation in the North
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of a reduction in the supply of Southern unskilled labor
Ls and an increase in Southern capital stock Ks on the direction of Northern innovation. In
Section 3.1, we analyze a special case of zero patent protection in the South (i.e.,  = 0).
In Section 3.2, we analyze another special case of complete patent protection in the South
(i.e.,  = ). In Section 3.3, we analyze the general case of incomplete patent protection in
the South (i.e., 0 <  < ).
3.1 Zero patent protection in the South
Here we sketch out the results in the main text and relegate the detailed derivations to
Appendix A. We focus on the balanced growth path and omit the time subscript for con-
venience. From (8) and (10), one can derive the following conditional demand functions for
xnl (i) and x
n
h(j).
xnl (i) =

Pl(Nl)
1 
pnl (i)
1=
(ln + ls), (26)
xnh(j) =

Ph(Nh)
1 
pnh(j)
1=
hn. (27)
Under the special case of zero patent protection (i.e.,  = 0) in the South, the steady-state
version of (25) simplies to
Vh
Vl
=
nh
nl
=
pnh
pnl
xnh
xnl
, (28)
where pnh = p
n
l = 
nqn. Substituting (26) and (27) into (28) yields
Vh
Vl
=

Nh
Nl
(1 )= 
Ph
Pl
1=
| {z }
price e¤ect
Hn
Ln + ls| {z }
market size e¤ect
. (29)
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This expression is similar to the one in Acemoglu (2002) except for the terms ls and
(Nh=Nl)
(1 )=, which captures the externality e¤ect. A decrease in Southern unskilled labor
Ls reduces the o¤shoring ls of labor-intensive goods. Therefore, we obtain the following
intuition from (29). When o¤shoring is absent (i.e., ls = 0), a reduction in the supply of
Southern unskilled labor Ls leads to only a negative price e¤ect by decreasing Ph=Pl; as
a result, Vh=Vl decreases causing innovation to be directed towards labor-intensive goods.
However, when o¤shoring is present (i.e., ls > 0), a reduction in the supply of Southern
unskilled labor Ls leads to also a positive market size e¤ect by increasing Hn=(Ln + ls); as
a result, Vh=Vl increases causing innovation to be directed towards skill-intensive goods. We
summarize these results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 If the equilibrium features a positive amount of o¤shoring, then a reduction
in the supply of Southern unskilled labor Ls would lead to skill-biased technical change (i.e.,
Nh=Nl increases). If the equilibrium does not feature o¤shoring, then an increase in the
supply of Southern unskilled labor Ls would lead to skill-biased technical change.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This result is consistent with the following stylized facts. First, the opening of the
Chinese economy for international trade in the 1980s implies a massive increase in the
supply of unskilled labor and causes skilled-biased technical change because there was very
little o¤shoring to China at that time. Second, the substantial amount of o¤shoring to China
in the present implies that the recent shortage of unskilled labor in China would also lead
to skill-biased technical change.
From (7) and (8), one can derive the following conditional demand functions for ls and
ln.
wsl =
PlNl
1  

Ksl
ls
1 
, (30)
wnl =
PlNl
1  

Knl
ln + ls
1 
, (31)
where we have imposed symmetry on xsl (i) = x
s
l = K
s
l =Nl and x
n
l (i) = x
n
l = K
n
l =Nl. A larger
Ks leads to an increase in Ksl ; as a result, w
s
l increases holding other variables constant.
Given that the equality wsl = w
n
l must hold when o¤shoring is present (i.e., l
s > 0), we have
Ksl
Ls   ls
1 
= 

Knl
Ln + ls
1 
, (32)
where we have used ls + ls = Ls and ln = Ln. Therefore, an increase in Ksl reduces
ls; intuitively, a larger Ksl increases the wage rate of Southern unskilled labor rendering
o¤shoring less attractive. This reduction in ls triggers a market size e¤ect as shown in (29).
As a result, a larger capital stock in the South leads to skill-biased technical change in the
North. We summarize this result in Proposition 3.
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Proposition 3 When the equilibrium features o¤shoring, an increase in Southern capital
stock Ks leads to skill-biased technical change (i.e., Nh=Nl increases). When the equilibrium
does not feature o¤shoring, an increase in Southern capital stock Ks also leads to skill-biased
technical change.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Although the comparative statics of Nh=Nl with respect to Ks are the same regardless
of whether or not the equilibrium features o¤shoring, the intuition behind the two scenarios
is quite di¤erent. In the absence of o¤shoring, the e¤ect of Ks on Nh=Nl operates through
the price e¤ect. Suppose there is a zero supply of high-skill labor Hs in the South. Then,
a larger capital stock Ks expands only the production of labor-intensive goods Y sl , which
leads to a positive price e¤ect by increasing Ph=Pl and consequently skill-biased technical
change. A similar intuition also applies to the more general case of Hs=Ls < Hn=Ln, which
we have assumed throughout the analysis.
3.2 Complete patent protection in the South
In this subsection, we consider complete patent protection in the South (i.e.,  = ). In this
case, the steady-state ratio of Nh=Nl can be expressed as20
Nh
Nl
=
"
1  

"
Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
(" 1)# 11 (1 )(" 1)
, (33)
where " > 1 and 1   (1   )("   1) > 0 because  > ("   2)=("   1). Equation (33) shows
that a decrease in Ls leads to an increase in Nh=Nl as before; however, Nh=Nl is independent
of Ks under complete Southern patent protection. Intuitively, although a larger Ks reduces
o¤shoring ls, any decrease in ls is o¤set by an equal increase in unskilled labor ls devoted to
production in the South. Because of complete Southern patent protection, the market size
e¤ect of unskilled labor depends on Ls regardless of its distribution in ls and ls. Therefore,
despite its e¤ect on o¤shoring ls, a larger Southern capital stock Ks no longer leads to skill-
biased technical change under complete patent protection. We summarize these results in
Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Under complete patent protection in the South, a decrease in the supply of
Southern unskilled labor Ls leads to skill-biased technical change (i.e., Nh=Nl increases).
However, changes in Southern capital stock Ks have no e¤ect on Nh=Nl.
Proof. See (33).
20Equation (33) can be derived by setting  =  in (A11) of Appendix A.
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3.3 Incomplete patent protection in the South
In this subsection, we calibrate the model for the general case of incomplete Southern patent
protection in order to provide a quantitative analysis on the e¤ects of changes in unskilled
labor and capital in China on the direction of innovation in the US. The model features
the following set of parameters f"; ; ; ; ; ; Ls; Hs; Ln; Hn; Ks; Kng.21 We either consider
standard values of these parameters or calibrate them using empirical moments in China
and the US.
For the discount rate, we set  to a standard value of 0.03. For the parameter on labor
share, we set  to the lower value of 0.4 in China because it also implies a more realistic
markup n = 1=(1   ) = 1:67. According to the Ginarte-Park index of patent rights, the
level of patent protection in China from 1995 to 2005 is on average 63.5% of that in the
US, so we set s   1 = 0:635(n   1), which implies  = 0:30. We normalize Ls to unity
and compute Hs using data on the share of population in China with at least some tertiary
education (i.e., Hs=(Hs +Ls), which is on average 4.6% from 1995 to 2010 according to the
Barro-Lee dataset on education attainment). Similarly, we compute Ln andHn using data on
the share of population in the US with at least some tertiary education (i.e., Hn=(Hn+Ln),
which is on average 51% from 1995 to 2010 according to the Barro-Lee dataset) and the
relative population size between China and the US (i.e., (Hs + Ls)=(Hn + Ln), which is on
average 4.44 from 1995 to 2009 according to the Penn World Table). We normalize Kn to
unity and compute Ks using data on the relative GDP between China and the US (i.e.,
(PhY
s
h +PlY
s
l )=(PhY
n
h +PlY
n
l ), which is on average 0.47 from 1995 to 2009 according to the
Penn World Table).22 For the remaining parameters f"; ; g, we consider a standard range
of values of " 2 f2:0; 2:1; 2:2; 2:3; 2:4g. For each value of ", we calibrate the values of f; g
using the following moments. For the o¤shoring parameter, we calibrate  using the value
of processing trade surplus in China as a share of GDP (i.e., wsl l
s=(PhY
s
h + PlY
s
l ), which is
on average 4.7% from 1995 to 2008).23 Finally, we calibrate the value of  using the college
premium in the US (i.e., wnh=w
n
l , which is on average about 1.7 from 1995 to recent time).
Table 1 reports the calibrated parameter values.24
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
"      Ls Hs Ln Hn Ks Kn
2:0 0:16 0:49 0:03 0:4 0:3 1 0:05 0:12 0:12 0:14 1
2:1 0:16 0:49 0:03 0:4 0:3 1 0:05 0:12 0:12 0:14 1
2:2 0:16 0:48 0:03 0:4 0:3 1 0:05 0:12 0:12 0:14 1
2:3 0:16 0:48 0:03 0:4 0:3 1 0:05 0:12 0:12 0:14 1
2:4 0:16 0:48 0:03 0:4 0:3 1 0:05 0:12 0:12 0:14 1
We consider two policy experiments. First, we reduce the supply of unskilled labor in the
South and examine its e¤ect on Nh=Nl and wnh=w
n
l .
25 Second, we increase the capital stock
21It can be shown that the calibration and simulation of the interested variables are independent of .
22There are two versions of data on China in the Penn World Table, and we compute our values using
both versions and taking an average of the two values.
23Data on the value of processing trade surplus in China is obtained from Xing (2011). Data on Chinas
GDP is obtained from United Nations: National Account Main Aggregates Database.
24We provide the equilibrium expressions for calibration in an unpublished appendix (see Appendix B).
25It is useful to note that wnh=w
n
l = w
s
h=w
s
l in this model.
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in the South and examine its e¤ect on Nh=Nl and wnh=w
n
l . Table 2 reports the results.
26
Due to skill-biased technical change, either a decrease in Ls or an increase in Ks would raise
the skill premium in the North. The magnitude of the changes is sensitive to the value of "
(i.e., the elasticity of substitution between skill-intensive and labor-intensive goods) as is well
known in the literature. Suppose we consider a moderate value of " = 2:2 as our benchmark.
Then, we nd that a 1% decrease in the supply of unskilled labor Ls in China would lead to
a 0.8% increase in the skill premium in the US, whereas a 1% increase in the capital stock
Ks in China could lead to a 0.6% increase in the skill premium in the US. If we consider
a larger value of " = 2:4, then a 1% decrease in unskilled labor (1% increase in capital) in
China would raise the skill premium in the US by as much as 3.7% (2.0%).
Table 2a: 1% decrease in Ls
" 2:0 2:1 2:2 2:3 2:4
Nh=Nl 0:7% 1:0% 1:4% 1:5% 4:6%
wnh=w
n
l 0:1% 0:3% 0:8% 2:3% 3:7%
Table 2b: 1% increase in Ks
" 2:0 2:1 2:2 2:3 2:4
Nh=Nl 0:5% 0:6% 0:8% 1:2% 2:3%
wnh=w
n
l 0:3% 0:4% 0:6% 1:0% 2:0%
To have a better understanding of the e¤ects of Ls and Ks on the skill premium wnh=w
n
l ,
we derive27
wnh
wnl
=
"
1  

"=(" 1)
Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
 1=(" 1) Hn + 

Hs
Ln + 

Ls + ls(   )=
!#
, (34)
where   ("  1) =[1  (1  )("  1)] > 0 because " > 1 and  > ("  2)=("  1). Suppose
we consider the special case of complete Southern patent protection (i.e.,  = ). Then, (34)
simplies to
wnh
wnl
=
"
1  

"=(" 1)
Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
(" 2)=(" 1)#
. (35)
Under complete Southern patent protection, a decrease in Ls raises the skill premium wnh=w
n
l
if and only if " is greater than a threshold value of 2. Under incomplete Southern patent
protection (i.e.,  < ), our numerical results indicate that this threshold value of " can be
slightly below 2. Another interesting implication from (35) is that under complete Southern
patent protection, wnh=w
n
l is independent of K
s. In other words, an increase in Ks raises the
skill premium if and only if  < , under which Ks a¤ects wnh=w
n
l through o¤shoring l
s.
4 Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed how the Chinese economy could a¤ect skill-biased technical
change in the US. In our analysis, we have assumed that the supply of skilled/unskilled
26The results in Table 2 are expressed as percent changes in Nh=Nl and wnh=w
n
l .
27We provide the derivations in an unpublished appendix (see Appendix B).
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labors and the capital stock are exogenous. In reality, they are all endogenous variables.
In the case of China, their changes are mainly driven by economic development. As the
economy develops, the share of skilled labor in the work force and the stock of physical
capital increase. As a result, the smaller supply of unskilled labor and the larger supply
of physical capital reinforce each other in triggering skill-biased technical change through
o¤shoring. Furthermore, if the reduction in the supply of unskilled labor also increases the
skill premium in both the US and China as in our simulation results,28 then there would be
more incentives for skill acquisition in both countries increasing the supply of skilled labor
and triggering further skill-biased technical change. Therefore, we believe that our results are
robust to the endogenous accumulation of physical and human capital. However, allowing
for these additional features would signicantly complicate our analysis, so that we leave
these interesting extensions to future research.
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Appendix A
In this appendix, we provide proofs of the propositions. Before we proceed to the proofs,
it would be helpful to rst present the following preliminary derivations. The prices of
intermediate inputs do not depend on z 2 fl; hg, so that pnl;t = pnh;t = nqnt = pnt and
psl;t = p
s
h;t = 
sqst = p
s
t . The conditional demand functions for labors are
wsl;t =
Pl;t
1   (l
s
t )
 1  xsl;t1  (Nl;t)2 , (A1-a)
wnl;t =
Pl;t
1   (l
n
t + l
s
t)
 1  xnl;t1  (Nl;t)2 , (A1-b)
wsh;t =
Ph;t
1   (h
s
t)
 1  xsh;t1  (Nh;t)2 , (A1-c)
wnh;t =
Ph;t
1   (h
n
t )
 1  xnh;t1  (Nh;t)2 . (A1-d)
The conditional demand functions for intermediate inputs are
xsl;t = (Pl;t)
1
 (pst)
  1
 (lst )(Nl;t)
1 
 , (A1-e)
xnl;t = (Pl;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1
 (lnt + l
s
t)(Nl;t)
1 
 , (A1-f)
xsh;t = (Ph;t)
1
 (pst)
  1
 (hst)(Nh;t)
1 
 , (A1-g)
xnh;t = (Ph;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1
 (hnt )(Nh;t)
1 
 . (A1-h)
When o¤shoring takes place in equilibrium (i.e., lst > 0), the marginal productivity of do-
mestic unskilled labor must be proportional to the marginal productivity of foreign unskilled
labor subject to the o¤shoring cost ; therefore, we have wnl;t = w
s
l;t. Using this condition
along with the above rst-order conditions, we obtain
pnt
pst
= 

1  . (A2)
Because the nal-goods sector is perfectly competitive, prot maximization implies
Ph;t
Pl;t
=
1  

 
Y nh;t + Y
s
h;t
Y nl;t + Y
s
l;t
!  1
"
. (A3)
The production functions (7)-(10) can be re-expressed as
Y sl;t =
lst
1   (Pl;t)
1 
 (Nl;t)
1
 (pst)
  1 
 ; (A4-a)
Y nl;t =
lnt + l
s
t
1   (Pl;t)
1 
 (Nl;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1 
 ; (A4-b)
Y sh;t =
hst
1   (Ph;t)
1 
 (Nh;t)
1
 (pst)
  1 
 ; (A4-c)
Y nh;t =
hnt
1   (Ph;t)
1 
 (Nh;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1 
 : (A4-d)
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Taking into account (A4) together with the labor-market-clearing conditions, (A2) and (A3)
imply
Ph;t
Pl;t
=

1  

 "
1+(" 1)

Nh;t
Nl;t
  1
1+(" 1)

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
  
1+(" 1)
, (A5)
which serves as the rst condition that we will use to solve for the steady-state equilibrium
values of fNh;t=Nl;t; Ph;t=Pl;t; lstg. The other two conditions can be derived as follows.
The R&D conditions imply that Vz;t =  and thus _Vz;t = 0 when _Nz;t > 0 for z 2 fl; hg.
Using (25), we obtain
rt =
nz;t + 
s
z;t

. (A6)
The equilibrium bias is Vh;t=Vl;t = (nh;t + 
s
h;t)=(
n
l;t + 
s
l;t) = 1. Also using (13), (16), (19),
(22), (A1) and (A2), we derive
Ph;t
Pl;t
=

Nh;t
Nl;t
 (1 ) 

Hs +Hn


(Ls   lst) + Ln + lst
! 
. (A7)
Finally, the capital-market conditions give rise to29
Ph;t
Pl;t
=

Nh;t
Nl;t
 10@

1=(1 )K
n
Ks
+ 

lst + L
n   1=(1 )Ls Kn
Ks
1=(1 )Hs K
n
Ks
 Hn
1A , (A8)
noting (A1) and (A2). The steady-state equilibrium values of fNh;t=Nl;t; Ph;t=Pl;t; lstg are
determined by (A5), (A7) and (A8) along with the resource constraint lst 2 [0; Ls].
Proof of Proposition 1 . Using (A7), one can show that if the following inequality holds,
Ph;t
Pl;t
>

Nh;t
Nl;t
 (1 ) 

Hs +Hn


(Ls   ls) + Ln + ls
! 
, (A9)
then Vh;t =
 
nh;t + 
s
h;t

=rt =  and Vl;t < , which imply that _Nh;t > 0 and _Nl;t = 0:
Combined with (A5), this inequality can be rewritten as
Nh;t
Nl;t
<

1  

 "
1 (1 )(" 1)

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
  1
1 (1 )(" 1)  

Hs+Hn


(Ls ls)+Ln+ls
 1+(" 1)
1 (1 )(" 1)
,
(A10)
where ls 2 [0; Ls] is given by its steady-state equilibrium value. Thus, following Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (2001), we have shown that there is only one type of innovation o¤ the steady
29To derive (A8), we use
Ks
Kn
=
xsh;tNh;t + x
s
l;tNl;t
xnh;tNh;t + x
n
l;tNl;t
=
Nl;t (Pl;t)
1
 (pst )
  1
 (lst )(Nl;t)
1 
 +Nh;t (Ph;t)
1
 (pst )
  1
 (Hs)(Nh;t)
1 

Nl;t (Pl;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1
 (Ln+lst )(Nl;t)
1 
 +Nh;t (Ph;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1
 (Hn)(Nh;t)
1 

:
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state, and the economy monotonically reaches the balanced growth path in nite time. On
the balanced growth path, Nh;t and Nl;t grow at the same rate. The same proof can be
applied to an economy starting from Nh;t=Nl;t larger than the right-hand side of (A10).
In the rest of this proof, we consider the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Using (A5), (A7) and (A8), we derive the following two conditions that can be used to solve
for the steady-state equilibrium values of fNh=Nl; lsg.
Nh
Nl
=

1  

 "
1 (1 )(" 1)

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
  1
1 (1 )(" 1)
 


Hs +Hn


(Ls   ls) + Ln + ls
! 1+(" 1)
1 (1 )(" 1)
(A11)
 F (ls),
Nh
Nl
=


1  
 "
" 1

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
 1
" 1
0@


1
1  Kn
Ks
+ 

ls + Ln    11  Kn
Ks
Ls

1
1  Kn
Ks
Hs  Hn
1A
1+(" 1)
(" 1)
(A12)
 G(ls).
F (ls) is (weakly) decreasing in ls because   . As for G(ls), it depends on the value of ;
specically, there are three parameter spaces to consider: (a)  > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , (b)
[(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 ,30 and (c)   [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 .
Recall that [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1  > [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  because Hn=Ln > Hs=Ls.
Case (a): If  > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then G(ls) is strictly increasing in ls guaranteeing
the uniqueness of the equilibrium (if it exists). To establish its existence, we need to ensure
that F (ls) and G(ls) cross within ls 2 [0; Ls]. First, F (0) > G(0) because F (0) > 0 and
G(0) < 0 as a result of Ln    11  Kn
Ks
Ls < 0. Second, F (Ls) < G(Ls) would also hold if and
only if  is su¢ ciently large.
Case (b): If [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then G(ls) would be de-
creasing in ls. Furthermore, G(ls) would be positive if and only if ls <

1=1 Kn=Ks Ln=Ls
1=1 Kn=Ks+

Ls.
As ls !

1=1 Kn=Ks Ln=Ls
1=1 Kn=Ks+

Ls, G(ls) = 0 < F (ls). Finally, G(0) > F (0) would also hold
if and only if  is su¢ ciently large; in this case, it can be shown that G(ls) crosses F (ls)
exactly once from above.31
Case (c): If   [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1  implying that

1
1  Kn
Ks
Hs Hn < 0 in G(ls). In this case, G(ls) must be nonpositive for ls 2 [0; Ls] because
Ln    11  Kn
Ks
Ls  0; therefore, an o¤shoring equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Propositions 2 and 3. In the following proofs, we consider the special case of
zero patent protection in the South. Setting  = 0 in (A11), we obtain
F (ls) =

1  

 "
1 (1 )(" 1)

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
  1
1 (1 )(" 1)

Hn
Ln + ls
 1+(" 1)
1 (1 )(" 1)
, (A11-a)
30It can be shown that if  = [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1  , then ls =

1=1 Kn=Ks Ln=Ls
1=1 Kn=Ks+

Ls instead of being
determined by (A12).
31On the other hand, if G(0) < F (0), then the model may feature multiple equilibria, which we rule out
by imposing a su¢ ciently large  to ensure that G(0) > F (0) holds.
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and G(ls) is the same as in (A12). The unique steady-state equilibrium values of fNh=Nl; lsg
are implicitly determined by solving these two equations. We need to consider the two
parameter spaces under which o¤shoring exists: (a)  > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , and (b)
[(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 .
Case (a): If  > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then G(ls) is increasing in ls. In this case, an
increase in Ks shifts up G(ls) and gives rise to a larger equilibrium value of Nh=Nl.
Case (b): If [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then G(ls) is decreasing
in ls and crossing F (ls) exactly once from above given a su¢ ciently large . In this case, an
increase in Ks shifts down G(ls) and also gives rise to a larger equilibrium value of Nh=Nl.
We summarize these results in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: If  > [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then an increase inKs would lead to an increase
in Nh=Nl.
Using (A11-a) and (A12), we derive the following condition that implicitly determines
Nh=Nl.
Hn
Hs


1
1  Kn
Ks
+ 

Nh
Nl
  1 (1 )(" 1)
1+(" 1) (A13)
= 


1
1  Kn
Ks
  Hn
Hs

Nh
Nl
 " 1
1+(" 1)
+ 
1
1  Kn
Ks


1 
 "
1+(" 1)  Hn
Hs
+ 
 1
1+(" 1) (Ln + Ls)
(" 1)
1+(" 1) .
Once again, we need to consider the two parameter spaces under which o¤shoring exists: (a)
 > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , and (b) [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 .
Case (a): If  > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then the right-hand side of (A13) is increasing
in Nh=Nl, whereas the left-hand side of (A13) is always decreasing in Nh=Nl. In this case, a
decrease in Ls shifts down the right-hand side and gives rise to a larger equilibrium value of
Nh=Nl.
Case (b): If [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then the right-hand
side of (A13) is also decreasing in Nh=Nl and crosses the left-hand side exactly once from
below. In this case, a decrease in Ls shifts down the right-hand side and also gives rise to a
larger equilibrium value of Nh=Nl. We summarize these results in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2: If  > [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then a decrease in Ls would lead to an increase
in Nh=Nl.
Zero-o¤shoring equilibrium: Now we consider the case of   [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 ,
under which o¤shoring does not take place in equilibrium (i.e., ls = 0). In this case, we
derive three equilibrium conditions,
Ph
Pl
=

1  

 "
1+(" 1)

Nh
Nl
  1
1+(" 1)
 
(Hs) (ps) (1 )= + (Hn) (pn) (1 )=
(Ls) (ps) (1 )= + (Ln) (pn) (1 )=
!  
1+(" 1)
,
(A14)
Ph
Pl
=

Hn
Ln
  
Nh
Nl
 (1 )
, (A15)
pn
ps
1=
=
Ks
Kn
(Ln) + (Ph=Pl)
1= (Hn)(Nh=Nl)
1=
(Ls) + (Ph=Pl)
1= (Hs)(Nh=Nl)1=
, (A16)
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which correspond to (A5), (A7) and (A8), respectively. Substituting (A15) and (A16) into
(A14), we obtain
Nh
Nl
=

1  

 "
1 (1 )(" 1)

Hn
Ln
 1+(" 1)
1 (1 )(" 1)
 
Ls

Ks
Kn

1+
Nh
Nl
(1 )
+Ln

Ls
Ln
+H
s
Hn
Nh
Nl
1 
Hs

Ks
Kn

1+
Nh
Nl
(1 )
+Hn

Ls
Ln
+H
s
Hn
Nh
Nl
1 
! 1
1 (1 )(" 1)
.
(A17)
Because Hn=Ln > Hs=Ls, the right-hand side is monotonically increasing and concave in
Nh=Nl, which ensures the unique existence of a steady-state equilibrium. One can show that
the right-hand side is increasing in Ls and Ks, so we can prove the following lemma by
means of a usual graphical analysis.
Lemma 3: If   [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then there would be no outsourcing in equilib-
rium (i.e., ls = 0); in this case, an increase in Ls or Ks leads to an increase in Nh=Nl.
Finally, note that Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 prove Proposition 2, whereas Lemma 1 and
Lemma 3 prove Proposition 3.
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Appendix B: Not for publication
In this appendix, we provide the equilibrium expressions for calibrating the model: (a) o¤-
shoring as a share of GDP wsl l
s=(PlY
s
l +PhY
s
h ), (b) the relative GDP (PlY
s
l +PhY
s
h )=(PhY
n
h +
PlY
n
l ), and (c) the skill premium w
n
h=w
n
l . Note that (5) implies
Pl =
 
" + (1  )"

Ph
Pl
1 "! 1" 1
, (B1-a)
Ph =
 
"

Ph
Pl
 (1 ")
+ (1  )"
! 1
" 1
. (B1-b)
Then, using the capital-market condition for s and (A1), we obtain
ps = (Ks) 

(Pl)
1
 (ls)(Nl)
1
 + (Ph)
1
 (Hs)(Nh)
1


. (B2)
As for PlY nl + PhY
n
h , we use (A4) to obtain
PhY
n
h + PlY
n
l =


1 Kn
1   (Pl) (Nl)

HsLn  HnLs + (Hn + Hs) ls

1
1 KnHs  KsHn

, (B3)
noting (A2) and (A8). Using (A1), we obtain
wsl =
 (Pl) (Nl)
1  

PlNl
ps
 1 

. (B4)
Using (A4), (A8) and (B2), we obtain
PlY
s
l + PhY
s
h =
Ks
1   (Pl) (Nl)

HsLn  HnLs + (Hn + Hs) ls

1
1 KnHs  KsHn

. (B5)
Using (B2), (B4) and (B5), we obtain
wsl l
s
PlY sl + PhY
s
h
=



1
1 KnHs  KsHn

ls
Ks (HsLn  HnLs + (Hn + Hs) ls) . (B6)
Using (B3) and (B5), we obtain
PlY
s
l + PhY
s
h
PhY nh + PlY
n
l
=
Ks


1 Kn
. (B7)
Finally, using (A1), we obtain
wnh
wnl
=

Ph
Pl
Nh
Nl
 1

. (B8)
By (A5) and (A7),
Ph
Pl
Nh
Nl
 1

=
 
1  

"=(" 1)
Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
 1=(" 1) Hn + 

Hs
Ln + 

Ls + ls(   )=
!! " 1
1 (1 )(" 1)
:
(B9)
Then, (B8) and (B9) imply (34).
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